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Abstract
Can nondemocratic leaders initiate a crackdown against mass protesters and suffer little in the way of
political-reputational costs? In conceptualizing a “crackdown” as a government-orchestrated violent
restriction of civil society involving the killing of civilians, this article analyzes how the use of force is
perceived by ordinary citizens when their government represses a portion of the populace. In analyzing the
findings of a 2016 survey that gauges contemporary attitudes toward the overthrow of presidents Askar Akaev
(in 2005) and Kurmanbek Bakiev (in 2010), this article argues that Kyrgyzstanis evaluate the Bakiev
administration more negatively than they do the Akaev administration because of the former’s resort to
forcefulmeasures in attempting toquellmass protesters inApril 2010. Such findings imply that nondemocratic
leaderswho employ force againstmass protesters incur significant political-reputational costs, irrespective as to
whether the wider public views the mass protests as legitimate or not.
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Introduction
All nondemocratic leaders utilize coercion to some extent to maintain political order. Yet can such
leaders brazenly repress mass protesters and get away with it? In analyzing the “Color Revolutions”
of Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, and Ukraine in 2004–2005, one common feature of the
Bulldozer, Rose, and Orange revolutions concerned these governments’ seeming inability or
unwillingness to resort to brute force tactics to stave off regime change (McFaul 2005, 14–15).1
Some scholars contend that regime change occurred within these countries due to the absence of
“highly institutionalized ruling parties,” the underfunded and undisciplined nature of the ruling
regimes’ “coercive apparatuses,” significant levels of economic privatization, and “linkages” to the
West (Way 2008). In contrast, others have argued that “international donor support” and an
“electoral model” played a role in terms of exposing the corrupt nature of these governments and
issuing popular demands for regime change (Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 2009). Although it may
seem as if the color revolutions are but a relic nowadays, perhaps they still retain significance. After
all, a seemingly non-interrelated assortment of mass protests has recently taken place across the
former Soviet Union region. In some instances, governments resorted to violence against mass
protesters, going so far as shooting civilians in public squares. In cases such as Kyrgyzstan in 2010
and Ukraine in 2014, however, the employment of such violence (at the very least) failed to subdue
the mass protests and arguably backfired to such an extent that it sparked the downfall of these
governments and the flight of President Kurmanbek Bakiev to Belarus and Viktor Yanukovych to
Russia, respectively. Such outcomes raise the following research question:Do nondemocratic leaders
incur significant political-reputational costs for employing violence against mass protesters to stave
off regime change?
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This article explores contemporary attitudes in Kyrgyzstan toward the overthrows of former
presidents Askar Akaev in 2005 and Kurmanbek Bakiev in 2010 by reporting the findings of a
computer-assisted telephone interviewing survey conducted across seven regions and two cities
from June 30 to July 20, 2016, and offering a tentative explanation for such popular sentiments. The
survey results, which had 1,000 respondents, was carried out by a Kyrgyzstan-based subcontractor
of the BRIF Research Group (headquartered in Almaty, Kazakhstan). Respondents ranged in ages
from 30 to 89 years old, and approximately 91 percent identified as “Kyrgyz.”2 Initially, this article
highlights frequency distributions pertaining to popular opinions toward Akaev and Bakiev’s
administrations. Thereafter, cross tabulation analysis reveals the sentiments that Kyrgyzstanis
who did not participate in the 2005 or 2010 protests harbor toward their former leaders.3 Overall,
the main research findings in this article highlight that Kyrgyzstanis generally evaluate both the
Akaev and Bakiev administrations unfavorably, but the latter is considerablymore despised than its
governing predecessor. Furthermore, even though the 2005 and 2010 protests lack widespread
social support, the data set seemingly reveals thatmany Kyrgyzstanis look upon Bakiev unfavorably
because of his willingness to use violence in the face of mass protests in April 2010. Such a finding
implies that a nondemocratic ruler who institutes a crackdown will incur major political-
reputational costs as a result.
Cracking Down
Nondemocratic leaders utilize a variety of tactics to remain in power. Their playbook largely
consists of lying, cheating, stealing, repressing, manipulating, deflecting blame, and/or occasionally
killing anyone who stands in their way (Collier 2009). The academic literature further informs that
some nondemocratic regimes are more stable than others. In particular, certain systems (in which
elites come to power through armed struggle and administer via “single-party rule”) are more likely
to remain intact during difficult times because the elites build up networks with the local populace
and fuse the party with the state apparatus, instead of relying on rent-seeking initiatives (Smith
2005). In addition, it is beneficial for nondemocratic leaders to institutionalize their power to a
degree, so that elites (who within such a system will be afforded somewhat of a say in policy
making) give their support (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). In terms of analyzing the manner in
which nondemocratic governments employ violence against civilians, the literature diverges along
several paths. One direction focuses on the relationship between repression and radicalization.
Some scholars posit that highly repressive governments are more likely to engender the rise of
militant groups (McGlinchey 2005). A second direction emphasizes which types of nondemocratic
regimes are most likely to engage in state-sponsored massacres. Accordingly, nondemocratic
leaders who rely heavily on local security forces (or “armed government personnel”) to ensure
order and do not face “executive constraints” (thereby making it difficult for oppositionists to
reliably bargain with them) are able to carry out atrocities (Colaresi and Carey 2008). Relatedly,
when it comes to employing coercion “competitive authoritarian” regimes canmake use of a variety
of “high-intensity” and “low-intensity” strategies (Levitsky and Way 2010, 56–61). Yet what
happens when people stand in defiance against a nondemocratic government? A third direction
analyzes the dynamic between citizens and nondemocratic leaders when the former are able to
organize and challenge the latter’s claim to power. It has been argued that mass protesters are most
likely to succeed in ousting a nondemocratic leader if they diversify their ranks and exhibit
dissatisfaction with the government in a peaceful manner. Protests involving worker strikes,
boycotts, public demonstrations, and a multiplicity of interest groups thus have a far better chance
at succeeding than do oppositionists who make use of violent tactics. After all, the turn to violence
plays into the hands of nondemocratic governments, which can justify the commission of their own
coercive agents to utilize deadly force to preserve order (Chenoweth and Stephan 2014). But do
nondemocratic leaders incur significant costs for employing violence against mass protesters
contesting their authority?
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Protests constitute one aspect of civil society, in the sense that people who partake in them aspire
to limit or contest the authority of the state in some manner. Civil society groups “seek from the
state concessions, benefits, policy changes, relief, redress, or accountability” (Diamond 1994, 6).
In drawing upon this reference, a “crackdown” can be conceptualized as a government-
orchestrated violent restriction of civil society involving the killing of civilians, namelymass protesters.
A crackdown, as defined here, represents a type of “high-intensity coercion” on account of that such
an act of state-sponsored violence possesses “high visibility” and is designed to “target large
numbers of people, well-known individuals, or major institutions” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 57).
To be certain, nondemocratic governments facing mass protesters need not institute a crackdown.
Perhaps though a government’s decision to crack down is made in some instances because
protesters turn violent to realize their aims? Assuming this occasionally happens, the distinction
between mass protesters and mobs merits analysis. Accordingly, if a nondemocratic leader seeks to
carry out a crackdown, then he or she will likely depict mass protesters as an unruly mob (perhaps
by deploying provocateurs acting on behalf of the ruling regime into crowds of protesters for the
purpose of stirring up trouble and inciting violence). Any mobilized group contesting governmental
authority is thus likely to be portrayed by a nondemocratic government as uncivil, which in turn
arguably justifies the leader’s employment of repressive methods. But how can scholars objectively
assess whether any mobilized group contesting governmental authority amounts to a legitimate
socialmovement or amob?Overall, it is difficult to differentiate between the two, in light of thatmass
protesters likely view themselves as legitimate (irrespective as to whether they resort to violence or
not) while a nondemocratic government perceives them as illegitimate for challenging power.
Meanwhile, ordinary people are likely to hold differing opinions toward groups contesting authority.
Of course, some scholars may be hesitant to label those who participated in the 2005 and 2010
revolutions in Kyrgyzstan as members of an unruly mob, but the fact remains that both Akaev and
Bakiev were removed from power in an extraconstitutional manner. Furthermore, frequency distri-
butions for a question included in the aforementioned2016 computer-assisted telephone interviewing
survey show that while a plurality of respondents (34 percent) perceived both the 2005 and 2010
protests to be legitimate, a substantial portion (26 percent) considered both illegitimate. Meanwhile,
21 percent did not offer any opinion (see table 1).4 Bearing this in mind, this article seeks to uncover
how Kyrgyzstani citizens evaluate the attempted crackdowns by their former political leaders against
their fellow countrymen. Hence, in touching upon the complexities involved in determining whether
a gathered assembly of mass protesters amounts to a legitimate social movement or an illegitimate
Table 1. Contemporary popular attitudes on the legitimacy of the 2005 and 2010 protests in Kyrgyzstan.
Responses Frequency Percent
I believe that the mass protests against Akaev’s rule were legitimate in nature but
the mass protests against Bakiev’s rule were illegitimate in nature.
101 10.0
I believe that the mass protests against Bakiev’s rule were legitimate in nature
but the mass protests against Akaev’s rule were illegitimate in nature.
83 8.3
I believe that the mass protests against both Akaev’s rule and Bakiev’s rule
were legitimate in nature.
343 34.2
I believe that the mass protests against both Akaev’s rule and Bakiev’s rule
were illegitimate in nature.
259 25.8
I have no opinion on this issue. 210 20.9
Hard to say. 7 0.7
Refusal. 1 0.1
N 1004 100.0
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unruly mob, for the purposes of this article it is assumed that (1) nondemocratic leaders are likely to
perceive, as well as collectively depict, such protesters as members of an unruly mob, while
(2) ordinary people are likely to hold differing views with regards to the legitimacy and behavior
of mobilized social groups which seek to openly contest political authority.
Akaev, Bakiev, and the Revolutions
AskarAkaev (1990–2005) andKurmanbekBakiev (2005–2010) both presided over semiauthoritarian
political systems. However, they lacked a combination of institutions, resources, and skills to remain
in power indefinitely. Generally speaking, political contestation flourishes on occasion within
semi-authoritarian systems because elites seek to manipulate governing institutions for their own
benefit. Furthermore, such “hybrid regimes” (Diamond 2002) possess a “competitive authoritarian”
character since oppositionists are able to exert some influence (Levitsky and Way 2002). Regimes
which can be classified as such are therefore vulnerable to bouts of political turmoil because inefficient
governance is the norm while a vocal opposition aspires to further the process of “breathing
democratic life into the bones of formal representative institutions” (Schedler 2010, 78). Bearing this
inmind, themanner in which Akaev’s tenure in office ended substantially differs from that of Bakiev.
In analyzing the collapse of Akaev’s “soft authoritarian” regime, Edward Schatz (2009, 213–217)
argues that the former president’s poormanagerial skills (as evidenced by his ineptitude at “shoring
up support” and “narrowing” of a “patronage base”), limited access to resources, and inability to
bring the local media and opposition to a heel contributed to his downfall. All of these factors
arguably set the stage for the Tulip revolution. That said, the trigger behind Akaev’s overthrow in
the spring of 2005 was rooted in “localism.” According to Scott Radnitz (2006, 134–139), in
response to the February 2005 parliamentary elections losing candidates activated their clientelistic
networks, forged a temporary alliance, tapped into popular frustrations, and collectively rose up
against Akaev. Relatedly, HenryHale (2005, 157–158) posits that since Akaev did not seek to amend
Kyrgyzstan’s constitution to stay on as president for a third term, his “lame-duck” status rendered
him vulnerable to overthrow.5 It is important to highlight the elite-centric nature of the Tulip
Revolution, for EricMcGlinchey (2011, 96–100) contends that Akaev’s failure to dole out economic
rents to other powerbrokers in an equitable fashion (particularly after the opening of the US airbase
at Manas International Airport) severely undercut the president’s ability to govern effectively.6
Furthermore, Akaev arguably did not put up much of a fight when mass protests erupted in the
spring of 2005 (or if he did try to quell the mass protests then his crackdownwas sporadic andmuted
in nature). In the past local authorities had demonstrated a willingness to employ force to some
extent, such as in Aksy in 2002. The resort to brute force tactics in this instance, however, sparked
anti-government protests (Radnitz 2005). Hence, in 2005 when the mass protesters reached the
capital, Akaev seemingly fled in haste. Radnitz (2006, 134–137) claims that while Akaev had issued an
order to evict protesters from themain administrative building in Jalal-Abad and arrest the leaders, he
instructed local security “not to use force” against protesters in Bishkek several days later. Thus, in
assessing the Tulip Revolution the argument can be made that “in the final reckoning … Akaev’s
failures and personal fears played the primary role in the regime’s collapse” (Hill and Jones 2006, 115).
In contrast, Bakiev’s overthrow was brought about by a series of factors. In a general sense,
Bakiev’s attempts to suffocate the opposition, gross mismanagement of the economy, and corrupt
governing style spurred his downfall (Collins 2011, 153–156).7 In addition, public outrage against
deteriorating services (namely electricity) combined with Bakiev’s authoritarian governing style
and mismanagement of public “hydroenergy” concerns facilitated the 2010 revolution (Wooden
2014). That said, it is important to emphasize that Russia also expedited Bakiev’s downfall on
account of the president’s failure to make good on a promise to shutter the US military installation
at Manas in return for Kyrgyzstan’s receipt of a generous financial aid package from Moscow
(Collins 2011, 156). The event that sparked the 2010 protests concerned a jolting price hike in
electricity resulting from Russia’s cessation of subsidized fuel (Cooley 2010, 302–304). Unlike the
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Tulip Revolution, Bakiev’s overthrow also shook Kyrgyzstan’s fragile political system. Following his
ouster in April (which involved scores of civilian deaths), supporters of the deposed president in the
south initiated a failed counter-coup in May. Shortly thereafter, ethnic violence (which may have
been orchestrated by individuals in furtherance of discrediting Kyrgyzstan’s newly installed
provisional government and mostly involved Kyrgyz attacking Uzbeks) gripped the south in
June, resulting in many deaths, the destruction of properties, mass human flight, economic
downturn, and a heightened sense of social polarization (Collins 2011, 156, 159–161).
In observing frequency distributions of several survey questions, it is instructive to discover what
ordinary Kyrgyzstanis think about Akaev and Bakiev today. Table 2 lists the results of a survey
question concerning whether Kyrgyzstani citizens believe that the 2005 and/or 2010 protests were
“orchestrated or sponsored by foreign states.” Results show a nearly even split between those who
think that both were facilitated by foreign states, those who believe that neither were facilitated by
foreign states, and those who do not express any opinion.8 In turning to popular attitudes toward
Akaev and/or Bakiev’s attempts to suppress the 2005 and 2010 protests, results reveal a high degree
of contempt for Bakiev due to his use of (what respondents deemed to be) “excessive force”
(see table 3). Accordingly, a very substantial plurality (approximately 43 percent) opined that while
Akaev did not resort to excessive measures in an attempt to quell mass protesters in 2005, Bakiev
responded very harshly to mass protesters in 2010.9
Were Akaev and Bakiev thought to be justified in resorting to forceful measures to stifle the
protests against their administrations? In response to this survey question, a plurality (36 percent)
felt that neither Akaev nor Bakiev had any cause to “employ force.” Only a few respondents
(7 percent) opined that Bakiev was justified to resort to forceful measures in 2010 while Akaev was
not justified to do so in 2005, in comparison to more (18 percent) who felt that Akaev was justified
to use force while Bakiev was not (see table 4).10 Herein lies an interesting finding, for a large
plurality believes that Bakiev used “excessive force” while few think that the former president was
justified in doing so. In contrast, Akaev does not fit within such a framework.
Judging by the results of some additional survey questions, Akaev and Bakiev are not held in high
regard by their fellow countrymen. Bakiev, however, is disliked considerably more so than is Akaev.
In response to a survey question concerning the apportionment of blame uponAkaev and/or Bakiev
in regards to “the various domestic troubles facing the country today,” a majority (53 percent)
opined that both are “largely to blame” (see table 5).11 In response to another survey question
Table 2. Contemporary popular attitudes on foreign meddling in the 2005 and 2010 protests in Kyrgyzstan.
Responses Frequency Percent
I believe that themass protests against Akaev’s rule were orchestrated or sponsored by foreign
states but I do not believe that the mass protests against Bakiev’s rule were orchestrated or
sponsored by foreign states.
56 5.6
I believe that the mass protests against Bakiev’s rule were orchestrated or sponsored by
foreign states but I do not believe that the mass protests against Akaev’s rule were
orchestrated or sponsored by foreign states.
130 13.0
I believe that the mass protests against Akaev’s rule and Bakiev’s rule were orchestrated or
sponsored by foreign states.
265 26.4
I do not believe that the mass protests against either Akaev’s rule or Bakiev’s rule were
orchestrated or sponsored by foreign states.
266 26.5
I have no opinion on this issue. 274 27.3
Hard to say. 12 1.2
N 1004 100.0
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Table 3. Contemporary popular attitudes on the use of excessive force by leaders in 2005 and 2010 in Kyrgyzstan.
Responses Frequency Percent
I believe that Akaev used excessive force in attempting to suppress protesters in 2005 but
Bakiev did not use excessive force in attempting to suppress protesters in 2010.
58 5.8
I believe that Bakiev used excessive force in attempting to suppress protesters in 2010 but
Akaev did not use excessive force in attempting to suppress protesters in 2005.
427 42.5
I believe that Akaev in 2005 and Bakiev in 2010 used excessive force in attempting to suppress
protesters, respectively.
246 24.5
I do not believe that either Akaev in 2005 or Bakiev in 2010 used excessive force in attempting to
suppress protesters, respectively.
114 11.4
I have no opinion on this issue. 156 15.5
Hard to say. 3 0.3
N 1004 100.0
Table 4. Contemporary popular attitudes on the justification of leaders to use force in 2005 and 2010 in Kyrgyzstan.
Responses Frequency Percent
I believe that Akaev was justified to employ force against protesters in 2005 but Bakiev was not
justified to employ force against protesters in 2010.
176 17.5
I believe that Bakiev was justified to employ force against protesters in 2010 but Akaev was not
justified to employ force against protesters in 2005.
73 7.3
I believe that Akaev in 2005 and Bakiev in 2010 were justified to employ force against
protesters, respectively.
139 13.8
I do not believe that either Akaev in 2005 or Bakiev in 2010 were justified to employ force
against protesters, respectively
361 35.9
I have no opinion on this issue. 248 24.8
Hard to say. 6 0.6
N 1004 100.0
Table 5. Contemporary popular attitudes on Akaev’s and Bakiev’s responsibility for Kyrgyzstan’s troubles today.
Responses Frequency Percent
I believe that Akaev is largely to blame for the troubles facing the country today. 45 4.5
I believe that Bakiev is largely to blame for the troubles facing the country today. 104 10.4
I believe that Akaev and Bakiev are both largely to blame for the troubles
facing the country today.
534 53.2
I do not believe that either Akaev or Bakiev is largely to blame for the
troubles facing the country today.
151 15.0
I have no opinion on this issue. 167 16.6
Hard to say. 2 0.2
Refusal. 1 0.1
N 1004 100.0
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concerning perceptions of corruption with regards to presidential administrations since Kyrgyzstan’s
attainment of independence (Akaev, Bakiev,Otunbaeva, andAtambaev), a nearmajority (49 percent)
opined that all of these administrations are corrupt (see table 6). However, in observing presidential
administrations separately, Bakiev garnered the highest frequencies (22 percent).12 Kyrgyzstanis do
notharbor feelings ofnostalgia forAkaevorBakiev either.Uponbeing asked, approximately 58percent
stated that they did not wish to return to the time when Akaev was in power (see table 7).13 An even
more substantial percentage (73 percent) professed a disinterest in returning to the time when Bakiev
presided over Kyrgyzstan (see table 8).14
Over the past several decades since the Soviet collapse Kyrgyzstan’s “non-Asian non-Muslim”
peoples have emigrated elsewhere, thus leaving the country with a growing Kyrgyz population and a
substantial Uzbek minority (Wachtel 2013, 974). However, it is often stated that the country suffers
from a north-south divide with political implications for Kyrgyzstanis. In analyzing the dynamics of
this phenomenon, Maxim Ryabkov (2008, 309, 313) interestingly argues that popular support for
Kyrgyzstan’s political institutions is substantially stronger in the south in comparison to the north,
and although the divide may flourish on account of competing regional elites the nature of the
“north-south cleavage” is “intra-ethnic” and rather nuanced. Generally speaking, the north “refuses
support topolitical institutions andpersonalities… andexhibits ahighdegreeof alienation frompolitics”
Table 6. Contemporary popular attitudes on corruption within the presidential administrations of Kyrgyzstan.
Responses Frequency Percent
Akaev administration. 63 6.2
Bakiev administration. 220 21.9
Otunbaeva administration. 20 2.0
Atambaev administration. 53 5.3
I believe that all of these presidential administrations are very corrupt. 496 49.4
I do not believe that any of these presidential administrations are corrupt. 4 0.4
I have no opinion on this issue. 148 14.8
Hard to say. 1 0.1
N 1004 100.0
Table 7. Contemporary popular attitudes in Kyrgyzstan on a return to the Akaev era.
Responses Frequency Percent
I very much would like to return to the time in which Akaev was in power. 84 8.4
I would like to return to the time in which Akaev was in power. 148 14.7
I have no opinion on this issue. 188 18.7
I would not like to return to the time in which Akaev was in power. 288 28.7
I very much would not like to return to the time in which Akaev was in power. 290 28.9
Hard to say. 6 0.6
N 1004 100.0
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whereas the south is largely “loyal and optimistic” toward the institutions of the Kyrgyzstani state.
Furthermore, Eugene Huskey and David Hill (2013, 246–248, 259) contend that, in addition to a
variety of other factors, “regionalism” or “a sense of identity with North or South” influences
Kyrgyzstanis’ support for political parties. In analyzing the 2010parliamentary electionsHuskey and
Hill argue that regionalism partially explains why parties like Ata Jurt and Butun Kyrgyzstan
(which did not win any seats due to a “fluke” electoral provision requiring the party’s passage of a
“5% threshold of registered voters”) fared well in southern districts while the Social Democratic
Party ofKyrgyzstan andAtaMeken received high voter support in northern districts (248–249, 259).
So, are southerners predisposed to view the 2005 protests as legitimate and the 2010 protests as
illegitimate, as well as defend the Bakiev administration’s resort to forceful measures? And what
about a popular support base for Akaev among northerners? Are such Kyrgyzstanis more likely to
view the 2005 protests as illegitimate and the 2010 protests as legitimate, as well as express stronger
condemnation of Bakiev’s attempted crackdown? Upon grouping southern regions (Jalal-Abad
region, Osh region, Osh city, and Batken region) and northern regions (Chuy region, Bishkek city,
Naryn region, Issyk Kul region, and Talas region) together, cross tabulations were conducted
according to provincial location and (1) popular attitudes toward the legitimacy of the 2005 and
2010 protests; (2) popular attitudes on whether Akaev and/or Bakiev utilized “excessive force” in
response to the protests against their rule; and (3) popular attitudes on whether Akaev and/or
Bakiev had any cause to employ forceful measures. Interestingly, a large portion of southerners
(59 percent in Osh region; 54 percent in Osh city; 48 percent in Batken region; and 57 percent in
Jalal-Abad region) view both the 2005 and 2010 protests as illegitimate or do not care to voice their
opinion.15 Furthermore, in looking at the south, only in Batken region didmore survey respondents
view both the 2005 and 2010 protests as legitimate in comparison to respondents who viewed both
protests as illegitimate.Moreover, a considerable amount inOsh region (15 percent) and Jalal-Abad
region (15 percent) felt that the mass protests against Akaev (and not the mass protests against
Bakiev) were legitimate (see table 9). This is important because Bakiev is originally from the Jalal-
Abad regionwhile Akaev hails from theChuy region in the north. In contrast, amajority or plurality
of respondents within the northern regions opined that both the 2005 and 2010 protests were
legitimate (see table 9). Southerners though are not in a state of denial with regards to Bakiev’s resort
to forceful measures in April 2010. Accordingly, a plurality in each southern region (except for
Batken region) opined that Bakiev in 2010 (and not Akaev in 2005) had used “excessive force”
against mass protesters.16 Moreover, a majority in all but one northern region (Talas region) stated
that Bakiev in 2010 (and not Akaev in 2005) had used “excessive force” (see table 10). Lastly, with
the exception of theOsh and Batken regions, a plurality everywhere else stated that neither Akaev in
2005 nor Bakiev in 2010 was justified to resort to employing force against mass protesters.17 Slightly
Table 8. Contemporary popular attitudes in Kyrgyzstan on a return to the Bakiev era.
Responses Frequency Percent
I very much would like to return to the time in which Bakiev was in power. 63 6.3
I would like to return to the time in which Bakiev was in power. 64 6.4
I have no opinion on this issue. 134 13.4
I would not like to return to the time in which Bakiev was in power. 214 21.3
I very much would not like to return to the time in which Bakiev was in power. 523 52.1
Hard to say. 4 0.4
Refusal. 2 0.2
N 1004 100.0
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Table 9. Cross tabulations.
Question: Could you please state where you reside in Kyrgyzstan today?
Total
Osh
Region
Osh
City
Batken
Region
Jalal-Abad
Region
Chuy
Region
Naryn
Region
Talas
Region
Issyk-Kul
Region
Bishkek
City
Question: Some people believe
that the mass protests against
President Askar Akaev’s rule
were legitimate, while others
do not. Some people also
believe that the mass protests
against President Kurmanbek
Bakiev’s rule were legitimate,
while others do not. In your
opinion, do you believe that
the mass protests against
President Akaev’s rule in 2005
as well as President Bakiev’s
rule in 2010 were legitimate?
I believe that the mass protests
against Akaev’s rule were
legitimate in nature but the
mass protests against Bakiev’s
rule were illegitimate in nature.
28 3 6 27 9 8 2 2 16 101
I believe that the mass protests
against Bakiev’s rule were
legitimate in nature but the
mass protests against Akaev’s
rulewere illegitimate in nature.
10 6 6 14 11 1 2 9 23 82
I believe that the mass protests
against both Akaev’s rule and
Bakiev’s rule were legitimate in
nature.
38 14 29 35 63 23 24 38 79 343
I believe that the mass protests
against both Akaev’s rule and
Bakiev’s rule were illegitimate
in nature.
60 19 17 44 45 8 8 17 40 258
I have no opinion on this issue. 52 8 21 58 32 1 5 14 19 210
Hard to say. 3 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 8
Refusal. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
N 191 50 80 179 161 41 41 80 180 1003
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Table 10. Cross tabulations.
Question: Could you please state where you reside in Kyrgyzstan today?
Total
Osh
Region
Osh
City
Batken
Region
Jalal-Abad
Region
Chuy
Region
Naryn
Region
Talas
Region
Issyk-Kul
Region
Bishkek
City
Question: Could you please
state your opinion on
whether you feel that
President Askar Akaev or
President Kurmanbek
Bakiev used excessive force
in attempting to suppress
the mass protests in 2005
and 2010, respectively?
I believe that Akaev used excessive
force in attempting to suppress
protesters in 2005 but Bakiev did
not use excessive force in
attempting to suppress protesters
in 2010.
17 4 14 16 2 0 0 2 2 57
I believe that Bakiev used excessive
force in attempting to suppress
protesters in 2010 but Akaev did
not use excessive force in
attempting to suppress protesters
in 2005.
54 19 18 55 98 22 16 48 96 426
I believe that Akaev in 2005 and
Bakiev in 2010 used excessive
force in attempting to suppress
protesters, respectively.
34 14 16 43 38 10 19 21 51 246
I do not believe that either Akaev in
2005 or Bakiev in 2010 used
excessive force in attempting to
suppress protesters, respectively.
37 5 11 34 7 6 1 0 12 113
I have no opinion on this issue. 47 7 21 32 17 1 4 8 19 156
Hard to say. 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4
N 191 50 80 180 162 39 40 80 180 1002
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more respondents in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions and in Osh city also felt that Akaev in 2005
(and not Bakiev in 2010) was justified to employ force to quell mass protesters, as opposed to
those respondents who opined that Bakiev in 2010 (and not Akaev in 2005) was justified to do so
(see table 11). Taken together, although the north-south divide in Kyrgyzstan is revealed somewhat
when assessing popular opinions regarding the 2005 and 2010 protests in the computer-assisted
telephone interviewing survey, southerners do not adamantly stand behind Bakiev.
In summary, although both former presidents are seemingly despised by amajority of Kyrgyzstanis
today, survey results indicate that Bakiev is disliked considerably more so than Akaev. Of course, the
fact that Bakiev was in power more recently than Akaev may explain the greater degree of discontent
expressed toward the former. However, in regard to the aforementioned survey question concerning
popular attitudes on whether Akaev or Bakiev is largely responsible for “the troubles facing the
country today” only 10 percent labeled Bakiev as being solely at fault (see table 5). This is a
significant finding, for if the basis of popular hatred for Bakiev lies purely with the former
president’s governing style over the course of his tenure, then we would expect to see many more
survey respondents select this answer as a response. As such, a strong basis for such hatred plausibly
rests with Bakiev’s employment of violence in April 2010. It is important, however, to uncover the
manner inwhich bystanders (ordinary Kyrgyzstanis who did not participate in themass protests) or
members of the “non-mob” (for those inclined to view the so-called revolutionaries who toppled
Akaev and Bakiev as affiliates of an uncivil assembly) perceived the 2005 and 2010 uprisings and
ensuing responses by the Akaev and Bakiev administrations. In what follows, I analyze the opinions
of Kyrgyzstanis surveyed in 2016 who reportedly did not participate in the two most seminal
political events in their country’s recent history.
Mass Mentalities on Protests and Crackdowns in Kyrgyzstan
The 2010 protests, which originally began in the early spring, were tinged by a degree of violence, such
aswhen government buildings were stormed inTalas and other cities andmass protesters confiscated
armored vehicles and firearms from police in Bishkek. Arguably, President Bakiev was therefore
justified in resorting to aminor showof force to restore order.However, the refusal of Bakiev andPrime
Minister Daniar Usenov to concede to the demands of several thousand protesters in Bishkek by
meeting with them onApril 7, and instead responding with a demonstration of lethal force whenmass
protesters sought to breach the presidential building, aggravated relations between the government and
citizens. Several days later, Bakiev fled the country, initially to Kazakhstan, where he issued his
resignation, and then onto Belarus whereupon arriving he refused to abdicate (Nichol 2010, 2–5).
Did the mass protesters who participated in the overthrow of Bakiev amount to an unruly mob?
As previously stated, since protesters likely view themselves as legitimate while the government
perceives and depicts them as illegitimate, it can be difficult tomake an objective call on this issue. It
is clear that (1) the mass protesters had reason to be upset with the Kyrgyzstani government under
Bakiev’s stewardship in light of the utility price hikes in addition to other concerns, most notably
political corruption (Nichol 2010, 2); and (2) violent acts were carried out by some of the mass
protesters, thereby debatably justifying Bakiev’s resort to forceful measures to a degree. That said,
in analyzing several of the aforementioned survey questions via cross tabulation, several findings
stand out. It is worth emphasizing that approximately 80 percent of all respondents in the 2016
computer-assisted telephone interviewing survey did not participate in either the 2005 mass
protests against Akaev or the 2010 mass protests against Bakiev.
Bearing this in mind, cross tabulations reveal that approximately 32 percent of the nonpartic-
ipants of the 2005 and 2010 protests surveyed believed that both the mass protests against Akaev in
2005 and Bakiev in 2010 were legitimate (see table 12). Such a finding indicates that Kyrgyzstan’s
two revolutions lacked widespread social backing. Nevertheless, only about 14 percent of the
nonparticipants of the 2005 and 2010 protests surveyed felt that the Kyrgyzstani government
was justified to resort to forceful measures in both 2005 and 2010 (see table 13). In summary, the
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Table 11. Cross tabulations.
Question: Could you please state where you reside in Kyrgyzstan today?
Total
Osh
Region
Osh
city
Batken
Region
Jalal-Abad
Region
Chuy
region
Naryn
Region
Talas
Region
Issyk-Kul
Region
Bishkek
City
Question: Could you please
state your opinion on
whether you feel that
President Askar Akaev was
justified or not to employ
force against protesters
during the 2005 revolution
as well as whether you feel
that President Kurmanbek
Bakiev was justified or not
to employ force against
protesters during the 2010
revolution?
I believe that Akaev was justified
to employ force against
protesters in 2005 but Bakiev
was not justified to employ
force against protesters in
2010.
22 5 8 25 39 14 9 13 43 178
I believe that Bakiev was justified
to employ force against
protesters in 2010 but Akaev
was not justified to employ
force against protesters in
2005.
19 3 10 15 9 0 3 3 11 73
I believe that Akaev in 2005 and
Bakiev in 2010 were justified to
employ force against
protesters, respectively.
28 11 19 35 9 6 6 9 15 138
I do not believe that either Akaev
in 2005 or Bakiev in 2010 were
justified to employ force
against protesters,
respectively
55 22 20 54 72 18 14 35 71 361
I have no opinion on this issue. 65 9 23 49 31 3 9 19 40 248
Hard to say. 2 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 7
N 191 51 80 181 161 41 41 79 180 1005
N
ationalities
Papers
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Table 12. Cross tabulations.
Question: Could you please state whether you participated in themass protests in 2005which led to
the overthrow of Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akaev or the mass protests in 2010 which led to the
overthrow of Kyrgyzstani President Kurmanbek Bakiev?
Total
I participated in
the 2005 protests
but I did not
participate in the
2010 protests.
I participated in
the 2010 protests
but I did not
participate in the
2005 protests.
I participated
in both the
2005 protests
and the 2010
protests.
I did not
participate in
either the 2005
protests or the
2010 protests. Hard to say.
Question: Some people
believe that the mass
protests against
President Askar Akaev’s
rule were legitimate,
while others do not.
Some people also believe
that the mass protests
against President
Kurmanbek Bakiev’s rule
were legitimate, while
others do not. In your
opinion, do you believe
that the mass protests
against President
Akaev’s rule in 2005 as
well as President
Bakiev’s rule in 2010were
legitimate?
I believe that the mass protests
against Akaev’s rule were
legitimate in nature but the mass
protests against Bakiev’s rule
were illegitimate in nature.
19 4 8 70 0 101
I believe that the mass protests
against Bakiev’s rule were
legitimate in nature but themass
protests against Akaev’s rule
were illegitimate in nature.
6 9 6 61 0 82
I believe that the mass protests
against both Akaev’s rule and
Bakiev’s rule were legitimate in
nature.
19 19 48 255 2 343
I believe that the mass protests
against both Akaev’s rule and
Bakiev’s rule were illegitimate in
nature.
10 20 14 214 1 259
I have no opinion on this issue. 3 8 7 192 0 210
Hard to say. 1 0 0 6 0 7
Refusal. 0 0 0 1 0 1
N 58 60 83 799 3 1003
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Table 13. Cross tabulations.
Question: Could you please state whether you participated in themass protests in 2005 which led to
the overthrow of Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akaev or the mass protests in 2010 which led to the
overthrow of Kyrgyzstani President Kurmanbek Bakiev?
Total
I participated in
the 2005 protests
but I did not
participate in the
2010 protests.
I participated in
the 2010 protests
but I did not
participate in the
2005 protests.
I participated
in both the
2005 protests
and the 2010
protests.
I did not
participate in
either the 2005
protests or the
2010 protests. Hard to say.
Question: Could you please
state your opinion on
whether you feel that
President Askar Akaev
was justified or not to
employ force against
protesters during the
2005 revolution as well as
whether you feel that
President Kurmanbek
Bakiev was justified or
not to employ force
against protesters during
the 2010 revolution?
I believe that Akaev was justified to
employ force against protesters
in 2005 but Bakiev was not
justified to employ force against
protesters in 2010.
9 13 14 140 0 176
I believe that Bakiev was justified to
employ force against protesters
in 2010 but Akaev was not
justified to employ force against
protesters in 2005.
18 8 7 40 0 73
I believe that Akaev in 2005 and
Bakiev in 2010 were justified to
employ force against protesters,
respectively.
4 10 13 111 0 138
I do not believe that either Akaev in
2005 or Bakiev in 2010 were
justified to employ force against
protesters, respectively
18 20 37 286 0 361
I have no opinion on this issue. 6 10 11 219 2 248
Hard to say. 2 0 1 4 0 7
N 57 61 83 800 2 1003
N
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Table 14. Cross tabulations.
Question: Could you please state whether you participated in the mass protests in 2005 which led to
the overthrow of Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akaev or the mass protests in 2010 which led to the
overthrow of Kyrgyzstani President Kurmanbek Bakiev?
Total
I participated in the
2005 protests but I did
not participate in the
2010 protests.
I participated in
the 2010 protests
but I did not
participate in the
2005 protests.
I participated
in both the
2005 protests
and the 2010
protests.
I did not
participate in
either the 2005
protests or the
2010 protests. Hard to say.
Question: Could you
please state your
opinion on whether
you feel that
President Askar
Akaev or President
Kurmanbek Bakiev
used excessive force
in attempting to
suppress the mass
protests in 2005 and
2010, respectively?
I believe that Akaev used excessive
force in attempting to suppress
protesters in 2005 but Bakiev did
not use excessive force in
attempting to suppress protesters
in 2010.
15 2 2 39 0 58
I believe that Bakiev used excessive
force in attempting to suppress
protesters in 2010 but Akaev did
not use excessive force in
attempting to suppress protesters
in 2005.
13 36 37 339 1 426
I believe that Akaev in 2005 and
Bakiev in 2010 used excessive force
in attempting to suppress
protesters, respectively.
20 13 25 187 0 245
I do not believe that either Akaev in
2005 or Bakiev in 2010 used
excessive force in attempting to
suppress protesters, respectively.
6 4 12 93 0 115
I have no opinion on this issue. 2 6 7 139 2 156
Hard to say. 0 0 1 2 0 3
N 56 61 84 799 3 1003
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research findings highlighted in this article indicate that a nondemocratic leader’s decision to resort
to violence to stifle mass protests can cause his or her political legitimacy to crumble, even if the
mass protests do not command widespread popular support.
It has been argued that a government’s use of repression against civilians can “backfire,” in that
coercive state actions occasionally mobilize people, thereby setting the stage for turning an
opposition into a social movement. Acts of repression can serve as “transformative events,” pending
that the wider population views the state’s repressive tactics as “unjust” and the occurrence of such
an “event” is disseminated to “receptive audiences” (Hess and Martin 2006). In analyzing the 2016
computer-assisted telephone interviewing survey results via cross tabulations, it is quite evident that
Bakiev’s ill-fated crackdown was poorly received by Kyrgyzstani citizens. In regards to respondents
who admitted to participating in both the 2005 and 2010 protests, a plurality (44 percent) felt that
Bakiev (and not Akaev) had used “excessive force” against mass protesters, while 30 percent opined
that both former presidents were guilty of resorting to such measures. In regards to the non-
participants of the 2005 and 2010 protests, a strong plurality (42 percent) similarly felt that Bakiev
(and not Akaev) had used “excessive force” (see table 14).18 In turn, the bulk of respondents who
admitted to participating in both the 2005 and 2010 protests (45 percent) as well as a considerable
amount of non-participants in both of these protests (36 percent) stated that neither Akaev nor
Bakiev had justification to resort to forceful measures to quell the mass protests. Still, 18 percent of
the non-participants in the 2005 and 2010 protests opined that Akaev had justification to resort to
force in 2005 (while Bakiev did not in 2010). This considerably outweighs the 5 percent of
non-participants in the 2005 and 2010 protests who believed that Bakiev had just cause in 2010
(and not Akaev in 2005) to use force (see table 13). Such results lend support to the notion that
Bakiev’s crackdown was considered to be a heinous act.
Conclusion
My research findings thus tentatively argue that Kyrgyzstanis today evaluate the Bakiev adminis-
trationmore negatively than they do the Akaev administration due to the former’s use of violence in
April 2010. It is worth noting that the 2016 computer-assisted telephone interviewing survey
consists of 1,000Kyrgyzstani respondents, therebymaking it a challenge to generalize outside of this
country. It is also important to highlight that additional field research (particularly in the form of
interviews or focus groups) could further assess the causal link alleged within this article between
Bakiev’s 2010 crackdown and the generally widespread negative attitudes among Kyrgyzstani
citizens toward his rule. However, academics may infer that nondemocratic leaders who attempt
to carry out vulgar acts against mass protesters suffer political-reputational costs for doing so. In
other words, the employment of state-sponsored violence against a relatively small portion of a
country’s populace amounts to an act of desperation on behalf of the government in the eyes of the
wider public, thereby resulting in the disintegration of a leader’s legitimate claim to authority.
Granted, it can be argued that Bakiev’s legitimacy had already considerably deteriorated on account
of his heavy-handed governing style prior to the events of April 2010. Yet the substantial variation
in popular opinions regarding Akaev and Bakiev’s responses to mass protesters again highlights the
importance of the failed 2010 crackdown. Survey data results clearly show that Bakiev’s resort to
brute force was not well received by the public.
Overall, a government’s resort to forceful measures to quell mass protesters seemingly exhibits a
considerable negative effect. Other scholars who have studied the 2014 Euromaidan revolution in
Ukraine (which spurred the toppling of President Yanukovych) argue that the brutality inflicted
upon civilians inKyiv during the early stages of the protests significantly undermined the legitimacy
of the government and energized a movement (Kudelia 2014, 28–29; Onuch 2014, 45–46). The key
difference in Kyrgyzstan is that once Bakiev resorted to brute force tactics to cling to power, efforts
to restore the status quo failed instantaneously, thereby displaying the sheer weakness and hollow
nature of the ruling regime. Simply put, Bakiev’s forceful response to the mass protesters never
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materialized into a “transformative event” and it did not have to since the regime collapsed
immediately following Bakiev’s ill-fated crackdown.
Crackdowns are risky endeavors, for if they fail then the result may be regime implosion, civil
war, insurgency, foreign intervention, or some combination thereof. To be certain, crackdowns
occasionally succeed in terms of suppressing social movements. For example, in May 2005, the
Uzbekistani government violently dispersed an assembly in the city of Andijon in the wake of an
armed jailbreak (Khalid 2007, 192–198), thereby effectively terminating any potential challenge to
President Islam Karimov’s rule. In December 2011, the Kazakhstani government also suppressed a
worker strike which had turned violent in the city of Zhanaozen (McGlinchey 2013, 6–7). In these
instances, the governments in question halted the spread ofmass protests by resorting to a display of
brute force in the epicenters of mobilized social activity and denying citizens access to information
thereafter about what had actually transpired. However, it stands to reason that because of the
political-reputational costs involved, crackdowns should be instituted only as last resort measures
in the interest of averting sociopolitical chaos. This is especially the case with highly personalist
regimes like those across Central Asia. After all, once a nondemocratic government decides to
institute a crackdown against mass protesters the legitimacy of the leader, which has been
thoroughly cultivated over an extensive period of time, and the ruling regime is placed at stake
and can be squandered. Hence, when facing mobilized masses, embattled nondemocratic leaders
should refrain from employing brute force at the outset and instead strive to address popular
concerns through peaceful dialogue and negotiations, in the hopes of preserving their own
legitimacy, ensuring regime continuity, and averting their country’s downward spiral.
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Notes
1 Michael McFaul (2005, 18) does not include Kyrgyzstan’s 2005 revolution in his analysis of the
Color Revolutions.
2 The author retains proprietary rights to the 2016 survey data set. Surveying was conducted in
Bishkek city, Osh city, Batken region, Jalal-Abad region, Chuy region, Naryn region, Talas
region, Issyk-Kul region, andOsh region. Respondents were contacted viamobile telephones and
underwent verbal recruitment and informed consent procedures in Russian or Kyrgyz language
(approximately 10 percent opted to participate in the survey in Kyrgyz). All respondents were
30 years of age or older. Data results have been weighted according to a variable provided by the
BRIF Research Group. With respect to the survey design, “Refusal” was not initially included in
the listing of selectable responses to questions, so as tominimize its frequency. If respondents felt
uncertain about how to respond to a question, interviewers provided “Refusal” for possible
selection. “Refusal” was not provided for possible selection for designating residency. A survey
question requesting to designate nationality reads, “Can you please state your nationality?”
Respondents could select from “Kyrgyz,” “Uzbek,” “Russian,” “Other,” or “Refusal.”
3 Approximately 80 percent of respondents did not participate in the 2005 protests against
President Akaev or the 2010 protests against President Bakiev, while 6 percent admitted to
participating in the 2005 protests, 6 percent admitted to participating in the 2010 protests, and
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8 percent admitted to participating in both protests. A survey question reads, “Could you please
state whether you participated in the mass protests in 2005 that led to the overthrow of
Kyrgyzstani president Askar Akaev or the mass protests in 2010 that led to the overthrow of
Kyrgyzstani president Kurmanbek Bakiev?”
4 A survey question reads, “Some people believe that the mass protests against President Askar
Akaev’s rule were legitimate, while others do not. Some people also believe that themass protests
against President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s rule were legitimate, while others do not. In your
opinion, do you believe that the mass protests against President Akaev’s rule in 2005 as well
as President Bakiev’s rule in 2010 were legitimate?”
5 Schatz (2009, 217) also argues that Akaev’s declaration to not run for reelection amounted to a
“major miscalculation.”
6 See also Schatz (2009, 214).
7 See McGlinchey (2011, 100–108) for an overview of Bakiev’s ruling style.
8 A survey question reads, “Some people believe that the mass protests against President Askar
Akaev’s rule were orchestrated or sponsored by foreign states, while others do not. Some people
also believe that the mass protests against President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s rule were orchestrated
or sponsored by foreign states, while others do not. In your opinion, do you believe that themass
protests against President Akaev’s rule in 2005 as well as President Bakiev’s rule in 2010 were
orchestrated or sponsored by foreign states?”
9 A survey question reads, “Could you please state your opinion on whether you feel that President
AskarAkaevorPresidentKurmanbekBakievused excessive force in attempting to suppress themass
protests in 2005 and 2010, respectively?” Even though Akaev was unable or unwilling to institute a
full-fledged crackdown against the protesters in 2005, a considerable portion of respondents
(25 percent) nonetheless felt that both leaders resorted to methods deemed to be “excessive.”
10 A survey question reads, “Could you please state your opinion onwhether you feel that President
Askar Akaev was justified or not to employ force against protesters during the 2005 revolution as
well as whether you feel that President Kurmanbek Bakiev was justified or not to employ force
against protesters during the 2010 revolution?”
11 A survey question reads, “Some people believe that Kyrgyzstan’s former leaders are responsible
for the various domestic problems facing the country today, while others do not. What do you
think? Do you believe that either President Askar Akaev or President Kurmanbek Bakiev is
largely responsible for Kyrgyzstan’s problems today?”
12 A survey question reads, “Some people believe that corruption at the elite level in Kyrgyzstani
politics is a widespread problem, while others do not. In your opinion, which Kyrgyzstani
presidential administration is the most corrupt?”
13 A survey question reads, “Some people would like to return to the time in which President Askar
Akaev governed over Kyrgyzstan, while others would not. If possible, would you prefer to return
to the time in which President Akaev was in power?” In response, 29 percent stated that they
“very much would not like to return to the time in which Akaev was in power.”
14 A survey question reads, “Some people would like to return to the time in which President
Kurmanbek Bakiev governed over Kyrgyzstan, while others would not. If possible, would you
prefer to return to the time in which President Bakiev was in power?” In response, 52 percent
stated that they “very much would not like to return to the time in which Bakiev was in power.”
15 A considerable portion of survey respondents in each southern region though stated that both
the 2005 and 2010 protests were legitimate (20 percent in Osh region; 28 percent in Osh city;
36 percent in Batken region; and 20 percent in Jalal-Abad region).
16 Aplurality (26 percent) of survey respondents in Batken region did not give an opinion on this issue.
17 A plurality in the Osh (34 percent) and Batken (29 percent) regions did not give an opinion in
response to this question.
18 In contrast, only 5 percent of non-participants of the 2005 and 2010 protests surveyed answered
that Akaev (and not Bakiev) had used “excessive force” against protesters.
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